On 28th February 2025, Aldor Nini – director of Acromax Media, a company specializing in content distribution, cross-promotion, and brand protection – announced he had submitted a proposal to Albania’s Special Anti-Corruption Prosecution (SPAK) to create a “dedicated platform” for monitoring online electoral crimes. Nini warned that “staggering sums” of untraceable money were being poured into social media to influence voters and spread disinformation ahead of the May 11 elections, accompanied by coordinated attacks on news outlets and candidates’ profiles. He described an “online war” of fake news and smear campaigns aimed at swaying public opinion. To combat this, Acromax proposed establishing a digital monitoring center where anyone – including journalists or citizens – could report online attacks or electoral violations, which would then be verified and addressed in real-time. According to Nini, SPAK’s specialized cybercrime units could take immediate action by engaging directly with platforms like Meta (Facebook), YouTube, or TikTok to halt illicit activities. Notably, Nini pitched the center as a collaborative effort: a “civilian center” operated by a company (or consortium of entities) to assist SPAK, while SPAK handles the legal enforcement of election laws. He asserted that Acromax is uniquely positioned for this role – “the only entity with the technical [means] or communication [channels] with these platforms” – and even offered the company’s “consultancy for free” to help create a “lawful climate” online during the elections.
Acromax’s proposal raises concerns among media freedom advocates because it could amount to state-sanctioned censorship of political speech. Acromax has a controversial history of online content removal in Albania. Investigative reports and watchdog groups including Safe Journalists Network and Media Freedom Rapid Response have documented that Acromax systematically uses copyright infringement claims to take down content in a biased manner. Acromax’s enforcement is highly selective. This track record of silencing critical media via technical means fuels skepticism about Acromax now playing watchdog over election content.
A new “Social Media Election Monitoring Center” run de facto by Acromax might further institutionalize the censorship of dissenting voices. By labeling content as an “electoral violation,” authorities (or their private proxies) could remove posts or disable accounts in a manner that appears lawful, yet is effectively partisan censorship. This could shrink the space for public criticism, leading to a less informed electorate. In practical terms, a social media monitoring center must distinguish between genuine electoral crimes (e.g. vote-buying via social media, overt incitements to violence, coordinated foreign disinformation campaigns) and the normal cut-and-thrust of political debate (including harsh criticism, satire, or partisan spin). The worry is that Acromax – given its past behavior – might not draw that line finely.
In its published “Strategy for the Investigation and Prevention of Election Crime for the 2025 Elections”, SPAK identified social media as part of the electoral battlefield. The strategy explicitly calls for “monitoring of media and social networks for possible indicators of criminal offenses in the context of elections.” It also outlines the creation of official channels for reporting violations: SPAK plans to “set up a dedicated platform on [its] official website for reporting cases” of election crimes, including mechanisms for anonymous, real-time reports.
This would allow citizens, journalists, and even candidates to directly notify prosecutors about incidents like vote-buying, voter intimidation, misuse of state resources in campaigns, or potentially online offenses such as cyber harassment of candidates or illicit political propaganda. In addition, the strategy emphasizes inter-institutional cooperation – SPAK intends to work closely with the Central Election Commission (KQZ), State Police, other law enforcement agencies, and civil society organizations in a coordinated effort to safeguard election integrity. Transparency and accountability are recurring themes, with SPAK committing to “real-time communication with the public and the CEC” about election crime issues and publishing data on cases handled.
On the surface, Acromax’s proposal addresses a similar concern – the digital dimension of election crimes – and even mirrors some of the strategy’s elements (e.g. a platform for reporting, and monitoring social networks). However, there are critical differences in approach and governance. SPAK’s strategy envisions these tasks being carried out within the framework of state institutions and existing legal mandates. The dedicated reporting platform would be on SPAK’s website and presumably under its control. Nowhere does the strategy mention outsourcing enforcement to a third-party firm; instead, it focuses on strengthening SPAK’s internal capacity (e.g. setting up special investigative teams for the election period) and collaborating with domestic and international partners in an official capacity. SPAK’s blueprint is about impartial, law-based enforcement of election laws, with support from law enforcement and civic observers – not the delegation of authority to a single private entity.
Acromax’s proposal, by contrast, introduces a quasi-private “center” into this framework, which blurs the lines of accountability. Nini describes the center as “civilian…run by a company or some entities that help SPAK,” with SPAK then executing the legal actions. This suggests a parallel structure: Acromax would handle detection and perhaps initial assessment of social-media content, feeding cases to SPAK to act on. It’s an unofficial partnership not clearly defined in law. While SPAK did pledge to work with “private and state entities” in gathering information, this likely refers to cooperation with social media companies (e.g. requesting data from Facebook) or media outlets, not ceding its monitoring role to them. Embedding a private company within law enforcement activities is unusual and raises conflicts of interest – especially for a company that has clients in the media industry and ties to political figures. It could compromise the perceived neutrality of SPAK’s election crime crackdown. SPAK’s strategy stresses transparency and accountability, whereas Acromax’s past modus operandi has been opaque and unilateral.
Acromax’s proposal touches on a real need (monitoring online electoral abuses) that SPAK’s strategy also recognizes. Still, it does not fully align with European standards or the strategy’s envisioned method of operation. European legal frameworks demand that any restriction on speech – especially political speech – be lawful, necessary, and impartial. A monitoring center heavy on enforcement but light on safeguards could easily cross into censorship territory, as Albania’s recent history with Acromax demonstrates. The challenge for Albania will be to strike a balance: tackling genuine election disinformation and cyber abuses, without backsliding into censorship. This balance is precisely what European standards insist on.